A responsabilidade do para-si no exercício da liberdade em Sartre

Abstract

This work aims to analyze the concept of For-itself responsibility in the exercise of freedom in Sartre, from the work Being and Nothingness of Jean Paul-Sartre. Since freedom is understood by Sartre as an ontological reality that characterizes man, this work questions how the author conceives the responsibility of For-itself in the exercise of freedom. The nature of this research has a bibliographic character and was developed following the structural method. In order to carry out such an analysis, it was necessary to define and develop three specific objectives, namely: to examine in an introductory way the difference in the relation of the Sartrian concepts of “being-in-itself” and “being-for-itself” in the construction of the concept of "freedom"; describe the concept of nothingness in the exercise of freedom; and to present the aspects of the evasion of responsibility contained in the concept of “Bad Faith”. This analysis at first takes a brief look at philosophical existentialism, with an emphasis on Sartre's contributions on the subject, and examines in an introductory way the difference in the relationship of Sartrian concepts of “being-in-itself” and “being-for-themselves ”in the construction of the concept of freedom. In the second moment, it intends to describe the concept of nothingness in the exercise of freedom, emphasizing the role of conscience in this process. Finally, it presents some aspects of the escape from responsibility contained in the concept of “Bad Faith”.