O dever de fundamentação das decisões e sua aplicação no âmbito dos juizados especiais

Abstract

The Federal Constitution provides in its art. 93, item IX the guarantee that all decisions must be substantiated under penalty of nullity. Such guarantee started to be regulated in a specific way by the Civil Procedure Code in its paragraph 1 of art. 489, which highlighted which decisions are not considered reasoned. However, even though the 2015 CPC has instrumentalized the duty to state reasons, within the scope of the Special Courts, several problems persist regarding the application of §1 of art. 489 under the justification that contradicts the principles that guide the systematic of the special courts and that the special law subsists the general law. Notwithstanding the resistance regarding the application of an exhausted reasoning in the special courts, there is still, art. 46 of Law 9099/95 which allows Class Appeals to deliver an decision maintaining the sentence in all its terms, that is, allowing the delivery of an agreement without efficient reasoning. In this sense, the problem arises as to the duty to state reasons within the scope of special courts, in the sense of concluding whether § 1 of art. 489 of the Code of Civil Procedure in supplement to Law 9099/95. In order to solve the problem raised, through the analysis of the relationship between the principle of reasoning and some other constitutional principles, especially the principle of the double degree of jurisdiction and the standardization of that principle over time, understanding do Fonaje and the Special Courts of the State of Bahia, explain the grounds for which §1 of art. 489 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to special courts, as well as that for the effective exercise of due legal process and the constitutional guarantee of the reasoning of decisions it is essential that all decisions are duly substantiated, including those given in the Special Courts, once that the simplicity and low legal complexity required in the courts refers to the demand, that is, the cause of asking and the request, and not the quality of the judicial decision that resolves this dispute.